Ceo directors, executive incentives, and corporate strategic initiatives

Journal of Financial Research

Volumn 34, Issue 2, 2011, Pages 241-277

  Faleye, Olubunmi ^a  

^a NORTHEASTERN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 79959227469     PISSN: 02702592     EISSN: 14756803     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1475-6803.2011.01290.x     Document Type: Article

References (54)

1. Aggarwal, R. K., and A. A. Samwick, 1999, The other side of the trade-off: The impact of risk on executive compensation, Journal of Political Economy 107, 65-105.
2. Agrawal, A., and C. R. Knoeber, 1998, Managerial compensation and the threat of takeover, Journal of Financial Economics 47, 219-39.
3. Asquith, P., R. Bruner, and D. Mullins, 1983, The gains to bidding firms from merger, Journal of Financial Economics 11, 121-39.
4. Atanassov, J., 2008, Quiet life or managerial myopia: Is the threat of hostile takeovers beneficial for technological innovation? Working paper, University of Oregon.
5. Barnea, A., and I. Guedj, 2008, CEO compensation and director networks, Working paper, University of Texas.
6. Bebchuk, L. A., and A. Cohen, 2005, The costs of entrenched boards, Journal of Financial Economics 78, 409-33.
7. Bebchuk, L. A., M. Cremers, and U. Peyer, 2008, CEO centrality, Working paper, Harvard University.
8. Bertrand, M., and S. Mullainathan, 1999, Corporate governance and executive pay: Evidence from takeover legislation, Working paper, Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
9. Bertrand, M., and S. Mullainathan, 2003, Enjoying the quiet life? Corporate governance and managerial preferences, Journal of Political Economy 111, 1043-75.
10. Booth, J. R., and D. N. Deli, 1996, Factors affecting the number of outside directorships held by CEOs, Journal of Financial Economics 40, 81-104.
11. Borokhovich, K. A., K. R. Brunarsky, and R. Parrino, 1997, CEO contracting and antitakeover amendments, Journal of Finance 52, 1495-1517.
12. Boyd, B. K., 1994, Board control and CEO compensation, Strategic Management Journal 15, 335-44.
13. Byrd, J. W., and K. A. Hickman, 1992, Do outside directors monitor managers? Evidence from tender offer bids, Journal of Financial Economics 32, 195-221.
14. Chang, S., 1998, Takeovers of privately held targets, method of payment, and bidder returns, Journal of Finance 53, 773-84.
15. Cheng, S., 2008, Board size and the variability of corporate performance, Journal of Financial Economics 87, 157-76.
16. Cichello, M. S., 2005, The impact of firm size on pay-performance sensitivities, Journal of Corporate Finance 11, 609-27.
17. Coles, J., N. Daniel, and L. Naveen, 2008, Boards: Does one size fit all Journal of Financial Economics 87, 329-56.
18. Coles, J., N. Daniel, and L. Naveen, 2009, Co-opted boards: Costs, benefits, causes, and consequences, Working paper, Arizona State University.
19. Core, J. E., R. W. Holthausen, and D. F. Larcker, 1999, Corporate governance, chief executive officer compensation, and firm performance, Journal of Financial Economics 51, 371-406.
20. Coughlan, A. T., and R. M. Schmidt, 1985, Executive compensation, management turnover, and firm performance: An empirical investigation, Journal of Accounting & Economics 7, 43-66.
21. Denis, D. J., D. K. Denis, and A. Sarin, 1997, Ownership structure and top executive turnover, Journal of Financial Economics 45, 193-221.
22. Fahlenbrach, R., A. Low, and R. M. Stulz, 2010, Why do firms appoint CEOs as outside directors Journal of Financial Economics 97, 12-32.
23. Faleye, O., 2007, Classified boards, firm value, and managerial entrenchment, Journal of Financial Economics 83, 501-29.
24. Faleye, O., V. Mehrotra, and R. Morck, 2006, When Labor has a voice in corporate governance, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 41, 489-510.
25. Fich, E. M., 2005, Are some outside directors better than others? Evidence from director appointments by Fortune 1000 firms, Journal of Business 78, 1943-71.
26. Gompers, P., J. Ishii, and A. Metrick, 2003, Corporate governance and equity prices, Quarterly Journal of Economics 118, 107-55.
27. Goyal, V. K., and C. W. Park, 2002, Board leadership structure and CEO turnover, Journal of Corporate Finance 8, 49-66.
28. Guner, A. B., U. Malmendier, and G. Tate, 2008, Financial expertise of directors, Journal of Financial Economics 88, 323-54.
29. Hall, B., and R. Ziedonis, 2001, The determinants of patenting in the U.S. semiconductor industry, 1980-1994, RAND Journal of Economics 32, 101-28.
30. Hallock, K. F., 1997, Reciprocally interlocking boards of directors and executive compensation, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 32, 331-44.
31. Harford, J., 1999, Corporate cash reserves and acquisitions, Journal of Finance 54, 1969-97.
32. Jarrell, G. A., and A. B. Poulsen, 1989, The returns to acquiring firms in tender offers: Evidence from three decades, Financial Management 18, 12-19.
33. Jensen, M. C., 1993, The modern industrial revolution, exit, and the failure of internal control systems, Journal of Finance 48, 831-80.
34. Jensen, M. C., and K. J. Murphy, 1990, Performance pay and top-management incentives, Journal of Political Economy 98, 225-64.
35. Knoeber, C. R., 1986, Golden parachutes, shark repellents, and hostile tender offers, American Economic Review 76, 155-67.
36. Li, K., and N. R. Prabhala, 2007, Self-selection models in corporate finance, in B. E. Eckbo, ed.: Handbook of Corporate Finance: Vol. 1. Empirical Corporate Finance (North-Holland, Amsterdam), 37-86.
37. Maloney, M. T., R. E. McCormick, and M. L. Mitchell, 1993, Managerial decision making and capital structure, Journal of Business 66, 189-217.
38. Masulis, R., C. Wang, and F. Xie, 2007, Corporate governance and acquirer returns, Journal of Finance 62, 1851-89.
39. Meulbroek, L. K., M. L. Mitchell, J. H. Mulherin, J. M., Netter, and A. B. Poulsen, 1990, Shark repellents and managerial myopia: An empirical test, Journal of Political Economy 98, 1108-17.
40. Moeller, S. M., F. P. Schlingemann, and R. M. Stulz, 2004, Firm size and the gains from acquisitions, Journal of Financial Economics 73, 201-28.
41. Morck R., A. Shleifer, and R. Vishny, 1990, Do managerial objectives drive bad acquisitions Journal of Finance 45, 31-48.
42. Norton, E. C., H. Wang, and C. Ai, 2004, Computing interaction effects and standard errors in logit and probit models, The Stata Journal 4, 154-67.
43. Perry, T., and U. Peyer, 2005, Board seat accumulation by executives: A shareholder's perspective, Journal of Finance 60, 2083-2123.
44. Peters, F. S., and A. F. Wagner, 2008, The executive turnover risk premium, Working paper, Swiss Finance Institute.
45. Rosen, S., 1982, Authority, control and the distribution of earnings, Bell Journal of Economics 13, 311-23.
46. Scanlon, K. P., J. W. Trifts, and R. H. Pettway, 1989, Impacts of relative size and industrial relatedness on returns to shareholders of acquiring firms, Journal of Financial Research 12, 103-12.
47. Servaes, H., 1991, Tobin's q and the gains from takeover, Journal of Finance 46, 409-19.
48. Stein, J., 1988, Takeover threats and managerial myopia, Journal of Political Economy 96, 61-80.
49. Tajfel, H., and J. C. Turner, 1979, An integrative theory of intergroup conflict, in S. Worchel and W. G. Austin, eds.: The Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations (Brooks/Cole, Monterey, CA), 94-109.
50. Travlos, N., 1987, Corporate takeover bids, method of payment, and bidding firm's stock returns, Journal of Finance 52, 943-63.
51. Useem, M., 1984, The Inner Circle: Large Corporations and the Rise of Business Political Activity in the U.S. and U.K. (Oxford University Press, New York).
52. Weisbach, M. S., 1988, Outside directors and CEO turnover, Journal of Financial Economics 20, 431-60.
53. Yermack, D., 1996, Higher market valuation of companies with a small board of directors, Journal of Financial Economics 40, 185-213.
54. Zingales, L., 1998, Corporate governance, in P. Newman, ed.: The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and the Law (Macmillan, New York).