The market reaction to corporate governance regulation

Journal of Financial Economics

Volumn 101, Issue 2, 2011, Pages 431-448

  Larcker, David F ^a   Ormazabal, Gaizka ^a   Taylor, Daniel J ^b  

^a STANFORD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA   (United States)

Author keywords

Blockholders; Corporate governance; Executive compensation; Proxy access; Regulation

Indexed keywords

EID: 79957957446     PISSN: 0304405X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.03.002     Document Type: Article

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