Mutual funds as monitors: Evidence from mutual fund voting

Journal of Corporate Finance

Volumn 17, Issue 4, 2011, Pages 914-928

  Morgan, Angela ^a   Poulsen, Annette ^b   Wolf, Jack ^a   Yang, Tina ^c  

^a CLEMSON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF GEORGIA   (United States)

^c VILLANOVA UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Corporate governance; Mutual funds; Proxy voting; Shareholder proposals

Indexed keywords

EID: 79957461795     PISSN: 09291199     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2011.04.002     Document Type: Article

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