Power fluctuations and political economy

Journal of Economic Theory

Volumn 146, Issue 3, 2011, Pages 1009-1041

  Acemoglu, Daron ^a,b   Golosov, Mikhail ^c,d   Tsyvinski, Aleh ^c,d  

^a MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (United States)

^b CIFAR ^*  (Canada)

^c YALE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^d NEW ECONOMIC SCHOOL   (Russian Federation)

Author keywords

Commitment problem; Dynamic political economy; Olson McGuire hypothesis; Political compromise; Political economy; Political power

Indexed keywords

EID: 79956303462     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: 10957235     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2010.11.002     Document Type: Article

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