Dynamic Mirrlees Taxation under Political Economy Constraints

Review of Economic Studies

Volumn 77, Issue 3, 2010, Pages 841-881

  Acemoglu, Daron ^a   Golosov, Mikhail ^b   Tsyvinski, Aleh ^b  

^a MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (United States)

^b YALE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ECONOMIC STRUCTURE; ECONOMIC THEORY; INCENTIVE; POLITICAL ECONOMY; TAX SYSTEM; THEORETICAL STUDY;

EID: 77954074828     PISSN: 00346527     EISSN: 1467937X     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-937X.2009.00587.x     Document Type: Article

References (46)

1. Abreu D. " On the Theory of Repeated Games with Discounting" Econometrica 1988, 56:383-396.
2. Acemoglu D, Blundell R, Newey W K, Persson T. " Modeling Inefficient Institutions" Advances in Economic Theory, Proceedings of World Congress 2005 2007, and, eds, Cambridge University Press
3. Acemoglu D, Golosov M, Tsyvinski A. " Markets Versus Governments: Political Economy of Mechanisms" 2006, NBER Working Paper 12224
4. Acemoglu D, Golosov M, Tsyvinski A. " Political Economy of Mechanisms" Econometrica 2008a, 76:619-641.
5. Acemoglu D, Golosov M, Tsyvinski A. " Markets Versus Governments" Journal of Monetary Economics 2008b, 55:159-189.
6. Acemoglu D, Robinson J. Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy 2006, New York, Cambridge University Press
7. Albanesi S, Armenter R. " Intertemporal Distortions in the Second Best" 2007, NBER Working Paper 13629
8. Albanesi S, Sleet C. " Dynamic Optimal Taxation with Private Information" Review of Economic Studies 2005, 72:1-29.
9. Austen-Smith D, Banks J S. Positive Political Theory I: Collective Preference 1999, Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press
10. Barro R. " The Control of Politicians: An Economic Model" Public Choice 1973, 14:19-42.
11. Battaglini M, Coate S. " A Dynamic Theory of Spending, Taxation, and Debt" American Economic Review 2008, 98:201-236.
12. Becker G. " A Theory of Competition Amoung Pressure Groups for Political Influence" Quarterly Journal of Economics 1983, 98:371-400.
13. Bertsekas D, Nedic A, Ozdaglar A. Convex Analysis and Optimization 2003, Boston, Athena Scientific
14. Bester H, Strausz R. " Contracting with Imperfect Commitment and the Revelation Principle: The Single Agent Case" Econometrica 2001, 69:1077-1098.
15. Bisin A, Rampini A. " Markets as Beneficial Constraints on the Government" Journal of Public Economics 2006, 90:601-629.
16. Buchanan J M, Tullock G. The Calculus of Consent 1962, Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press
17. Chamley C. " Optimal Taxation of Capital Income in General Equilibrium and Infinite Lives" Econometrica 1986, 54:607-622.
18. Chari V V, Kehoe P. " Sustainable Plans" Journal of Political Economy 1990, 94:783-802.
19. Chari V V, Kehoe P. " Sustainable Plans and Mutual Default" Review of Economic Studies 1990, 60:175-195.
20. Dixit A K. Lawlessness and Economics: Alternative Modes of Governance 2004, Princeton, Princeton University Press
21. Farhi E, Werning I. " The Political Economy of Nonlinear Capital Taxation" 2008, Mimeo, Harvard
22. Ferejohn J. " Incumbent Performance and Electoral Control" Public Choice 1986, 50:5-25.
23. Freixas X, Guesnerie R, Tirole J. " Planning under Incomplete Information and the Ratchet Effect" Review of Economic Studies 1985, 52:173-192.
24. Golosov M, Kocherlakota N, Tsyvinski A. " Optimal Indirect and Capital Taxation" Review of Economic Studies 2003, 70:569-587.
25. Golosov M, Tsyvinski A, Werning I, Acemoglu D, Rogoff K, Woodford M. " New Dynamic Public Finance: A User's Guide" NBER Macroeconomics Annual 2006 2006, eds, Cambridge, MA, MIT Press
26. Grossman G, Helpman E. " Protection for Sale" American Economics Review 1994, 84:833-850.
27. Harris M, Holmstrom B. " A Theory of Wage Dynamics" Review of Economic Studies 1982, 49:315-333.
28. Hassler J, Krusell P, Zilibotti F. " The Dynamics of Government: A Positive Analysis" Journal of Monetary Economics 2005, 52:1331-1358.
29. Judd K. " Redistributive Taxation in a Simple Perfect Foresight Model" Journal of Public Economics 1985, 28:59-83.
30. Kocherlakota N. " Zero Expected Wealth Taxes: A Mirrlees Approach to Dynamic Optimal Taxation" Econometrica 2005, 73:1587-1621.
31. Krusell P, Rios-Rull J-V. " On the Size of Government: Political Economy in the Neoclassical Growth Model" American Economic Review 1999, 89:1156-1181. and
32. Lindback A, Weibull J. " Balanced-budget Redistribution as the Outcome of Political Competition" Public Choice 1987, 52:273-297.
33. Marcet A, Marimon R. " Recursive Contracts" 1998, Mimeo, University of Pompeu Fabra
34. Mas-Colell A, Whinston M D, Green J. Microeconomic Theory 1995, New York, Oxford, Oxford University Press
35. Mirrlees J A. " An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation" Review of Economic Studies 1971, 38:175-208.
36. North D C. Structure and Change in Economic History 1981, New York, W.W. Norton & Co.
37. North D C, Thomas R P. The Rise of the Western World: A New Economic History 1973, Cambridge, UK, Cambridge University Press
38. North D C, Weingast B R. " Constitutions and Commitment: Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth Century England" Journal of Economic History 1989, 49:803-832.
39. Olson M. The Rise and Decline of Nations: Economic Growth, Stagflation, and Economic Rigidities 1982, New Haven and London, Yale University Press
40. Persson T, Tabellini G. Political Economics: Explaining Economic Policy 2000, Cambridge, MA, MIT Press
41. Ray D. " Time Structure of Self-Enforcing Agreements" Econometrica 2002, 70:547-582.
42. Roberts K. " Theoretical Limits to Redistribution" Review of Economic Studies 1984, 51:177-195.
43. Skreta V. " Optimal Auction Design under Non-Commitment" 2006, Mimeo
44. Skreta V. " Sequentially Optimal Mechanisms" Review of Economic Studies 2007, 73:1085-1111.
45. Sleet C, Yeltekin S. " Credibility and Endogenous Social Discounting," Review of Economic Dynamics 2004, 9:410-437.
46. Uhlig H. " A Law of Large Numbers for Large Economies" Economic Theory 1996, 8:41-50.