A multi-task principal-agent approach to organizational form

Journal of Industrial Economics

Volumn 53, Issue 4, 2005, Pages 437-467

  Besankoj, David ^a   Régibeau, Pierre ^b   Rockett, Katharine E ^b  

^a NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF ESSEX   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 29744442303     PISSN: 00221821     EISSN: 14676451     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-6451.2005.00265.x     Document Type: Article

References (21)

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