Veto points, veto players, and international trade policy

Comparative Political Studies

Volumn 38, Issue 6, 2005, Pages 652-675

  O'Reilly, Robert F ^a  

^a EMORY UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

International political economy; Nontariff barriers; Tariffs; Trade policy; Veto players; Veto points

Indexed keywords

EID: 22944448978     PISSN: 00104140     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/0010414004274379     Document Type: Review

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