Curriculum for the twenty-first century: Recent advances in economic theory and undergraduate economics

Journal of Economic Education

Volumn 42, Issue 1, 2011, Pages 31-50

  Ferguson, William D ^a  

^a GRINNELL COLLEGE   (United States)

Author keywords

contemporary economic theory; undergraduate curriculum

Indexed keywords

EID: 78651289932     PISSN: 00220485     EISSN: 21524068     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/00220485.2011.536488     Document Type: Article

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