Cooperation versus free riding in a threshold public goods classroom experiment

Journal of Economic Education

Volumn 37, Issue 2, 2006, Pages 156-170

  Marks, Melanie ^a   Lehr, David ^b   Brastow, Ray ^c  

^a Longwood Center for Economic Education   (United States)

^b Department of Economics ^*

^c LONGWOOD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Classroom experiment; Free ride; Provision point mechanism; Public goods

Indexed keywords

EID: 33646417019     PISSN: 00220485     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.3200/JECE.37.2.156-170     Document Type: Article

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