Empty voting and the efficiency of corporate governance

Journal of Financial Economics

Volumn 99, Issue 2, 2011, Pages 289-307

  Brav, Alon ^a   Mathews, Richmond D ^a  

^a DUKE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Corporate governance; Hedge funds; Informed trading; Voting

Indexed keywords

EID: 78650307732     PISSN: 0304405X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2010.10.005     Document Type: Article

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