Hedge funds, insiders, and the decoupling of economic and voting ownership: Empty voting and hidden (morphable) ownership

Journal of Corporate Finance

Volumn 13, Issue 2-3, 2007, Pages 343-367

  Hu, Henry T C ^a   Black, Bernard ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN   (United States)

Author keywords

Equity swaps; G32; G34; K22; Record date capture; Shareholder voting; Stock lending; Vote buying

Indexed keywords

EID: 34249699743     PISSN: 09291199     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2007.02.004     Document Type: Article

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