Is this paper dangerous? Balancing secrecy and openness in counterterrorism

Security Studies

Volumn 19, Issue 1, 2010, Pages 66-98

  Shapiro, Jacob N ^a   Siegel, David A ^b  

^a PRINCETON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 77951635530     PISSN: 09636412     EISSN: 15561852     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/09636410903546483     Document Type: Article

References (148)

1. Genevieve J. Knezo, "Sensitive But Unclassified" Information and Other Controls: Policy and Options for Scientific and Technical Information (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2006), 10.
2. Daniel Patrick Moynihan and Larry Combest, The Commission on Protecting and Reducing Government Secrecy (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1997).
3. Knezo, "Sensitive but Unclassified" Information and Other Controls, 3.
4. "Homeland Security Presidential Directive Seven: Critical Infrastructure Identification, Prioritization, and Protection," Department of Homeland Security,17December2003, available at http://www.dhs.gov/xabout/laws/gc 1214597989952.shtm.
5. Patricia McDermott and Emily Feldman, Secrecy Report Card 2007: Indicators of Secrecy in the Federal Government, OpenTheGovernment.org, available at http://www. openthegovernment.org/otg/SRC2007.pdf.
6. and Rick Blum, Secrecy Report Card 2005: Quantitative Indicators of Secrecy in the Federal Government, OpenTheGovernment.org, available at http://www.openthegovernment.org/otg/SRC2005.pdf.
7. Only five report it has decreased.
8. The fixes embodied in the Information Sharing Environment (ISE) established under Executive Order 13388 focus on more effectively sharing information within government and pay short shrift to the value of sharing information with the public more generally. Thomas E. McNamara, "Information Sharing Environment Implementation Plan," Information Sharing Environment, accessed at http://www.ise.gov/docs/ise-impplan-200611.pdf, 24, 94, 8 March 2007.
9. and Harold C. Relyea, Security Classified and Controlled Information: History, Status, and Emerging Management Issues (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service. RL33494, 2006), 26-27.
10. "FOIA Guide, 2004 Edition," Exemption One, accessed at http://www.usdoj.gov/oip/foiact.htm, 7 April 2006.
11. In the 109th Congress, for example, bills designed to strengthen the FOIA and to reestablish the principle that agencies should err on the side of openness died in committee in both the House and Senate. See Restore Open Government Act of 2005, HR 2331, 109th Cong., 1st sess., available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d109:h.r.02331.
12. Open Government Act of 2005, S 394, 109th Cong., 1st sess., available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d109:s.00394.
13. See also Relyea, Security Classified and Controlled Information.
14. and John Cornyn, "Ensuring the Consent of the Governed: America's Commitment to Freedom of Information and Openness in Government," LBJ Journal of Public Affairs (Fall 2004). Three bills designed to encourage openness passed the House in the 110th Congress in July 2008-Reducing Over-Classification Act of 2007, HR 4806.
15. Improving Public Access to Documents Act, HR 6193.
16. and Reducing Information Control Designations Act, HR 6576-but were not passed into law.
17. David N. Gibbs, "Secrecy and International Relations," Journal of Peace Research 32, no. 2 (1995): 213-2-8.
18. and Francis E. Rourke, "Secrecy in American Bureaucracy," Political Science Quarterly 72 (1957): 540-64.
19. Francis E. Rourke, Secrecy and Publicity: Dilemmas of Democracy (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1961).
20. Morton H. Halperin, "Freedom of Information and National Security," Journal of Peace Research 20, no. 1 (1983): 1-4.
21. and Cyril E. Black, "Accessibility of Government-Sponsored Research in International Studies," International Studies Quarterly 14 (1970): 320-24.
22. Searching article abstracts and titles in the Social Sciences Citation Index for the words "government" and "secrecy" returns only seven articles in academic political science journals between 1973 and 2007, none of which analyze the practical trade-off between openness and secrecy. Index available at http://scientific.thomsonreuters.com/cgi-bin/jrnlst/jlresults.cgi?PC=J&SC=UU.
23. Dennis F. Thompson, "Democratic Secrecy," Political Science Quarterly 114, no. 2 (Summer 1999): 181-93.
24. Alexander J. Breeding, Sensitive But Unclassified Information: A Threat to Physical Security (Bethesda, MD: SANS Institute, 2003).
25. Evan M. Slavitt and Gregory D. Cote, "National Security vs. Public Disclosure: The War on Terrorism's Implications Upon Federal Emergency Planning and Right to Know Laws," National Security White Papers, The Federalist Society (December 2003).
26. Steven Aftergood, "The Age of Missing Information," Slate, 27 March 2005, accessed at http://www.slate.com/id/2114963/ on 12 October 2009.
27. and Lisa Graves, Senior Counsel for Legislative Strategy, American Civil Liberties Union, Testimony on S 394, the "OPEN Government Act," before the Terrorism, Technology, and Homeland Security Subcommittee of the United States Senate Committee of the Judiciary, on 15 March 2005.
28. John C. Baker et al., Mapping the Risks: Assessing the Homeland Security Implications of Publicly Available Geo-Spatial Information (Washington, DC: RAND Corporation, 2004).
29. Jacques S. Gansler and William Lucyshyn, The Unintended Audience: Balancing Openness and Secrecy: Crafting an Information Policy for the 21st Century (College Park, MD: Center for Public Policy and Private Enterprise School of Public Policy, University of Maryland, 2004).
30. Government Accountability Office, Managing Sensitive Information: DOE and DOD Could Improve Their Policies and Oversight (Washington, DC, 2006).
31. Government Accountability Office, Transportation Security Administration: Clear Policies and Oversight Needed for Designation of Sensitive Security Information (Washington, DC, 2005).
32. Government Accountability Office, Critical Infrastructure Protection: Improving Information Sharing with Infrastructure Sectors (Washington, DC, 2004).
33. Government Accountability Office, Information Sharing: Practices That Can Benefit Critical Infrastructure Protection (Washington, DC, 2001).
34. John D. Moteff and Gina Marie Stevens, Critical Infrastructure Information Disclosure and Homeland Security (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, RL31547, 2003).
35. John D. Moteff, Risk Management and Critical Infrastructure Protection: Assessing, Integrating, and Managing Threats, Vulnerabilities and Consequences (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service. RL32561, 2005).
36. and Knezo, "Sensitive but Unclassified" Information and Other Controls.
37. Moteff and Stevens, Critical Infrastructure Information Disclosure and Homeland Security.
38. This quote and subsequent quotes are from a survey of 186 U.S. federal, state, local, and industry homeland security officials. We identify sources by respondent number to maintain anonymity. The survey is described in the section "Secrecy and Openness in Practice." Respondent 725732258.
39. Joseph H. Felter et al., Harmony and Disharmony: Exploiting al-Qa'ida's Organizational Vulnerabilities (West Point: Combating Terrorism Center, 2006).
40. Jacob N. Shapiro and Clinton Watts, ed., Al-Qa'ida's (Mis)Adventures in the Horn of Africa (West Point: Combating Terrorism Center, 2007).
41. Brian Fishman et al., Sinjar Two: al-Qa'ida in Iraq's Foreign Recruiting, Finances, and Future (West Point: Combating Terrorism Center, 2008).
42. and Brian Fishman, Dysfunction and Decline: Lessons Learned from Inside al-Qa"ida in Iraq (West Point: Combating Terrorism Center, 2009).
43. Sean Gorman, "Networks, Complexity, and Security: The Role of Public Policy in Critical Infrastructure Protection" (PhD diss., George Mason University, 2004).
44. Government Accountability Office, Nuclear Regulatory Commission Oversight at Commercial Nuclear Power Plants Needs to Be Strengthened (Washington, DC, 2003).
45. Government Accountability Office, Preliminary Observations on Efforts to Improve Security at Nuclear Power Plants (Washington, DC, 2004).
46. Government Accountability Office, Nuclear Power Plants Efforts Made to Upgrade Security, but the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's Design Basis Threat Process Should Be Improved (Washington, DC, 2006).
47. and Mark Holt and Anthony Andrews. Nuclear Power Plant Security and Vulnerabilities (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, RL34331, 2008).
48. For a citation-mapping of jihadi public intellectuals, see William McCants and Jarret Brachman, Militant Ideology Atlas (West Point, NY: Combatting Terrorism Center, 2006). The most well-known of these public intellectuals is Abu Musab al-Suri.
49. Brynjar Lia and Thomas Hegghammer "Jihadi Strategic Studies: The Alleged Al Qaida Policy Study Preceding the Madrid Bombings," Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 27, no. 5 (September/October 2004): 355-75, analyze his 2003 policy paper which some believe inspired the Madrid bombing.
50. Jon Bendor, Parallel Systems: Redundancy in Government (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1985).
51. Analysts of encryption software have long argued that making the source code publicly available leads to more secure software because bugs are remedied which original developers may have missed. Scott A. Hissam, Daniel Plakosh, and Charles B. Weinstock, "Trust and Vulnerability in Open Source Software," IEE Proceedings-Software 149, no. 1 (2002): 47-51.
52. Steve Weber, The Success of Open Source. (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 2004).
53. and David A. Wheeler, "Why Open Source Software/Free Software (OSS/FS, FLOSS, or FOSS)? Look at the Numbers!" accessed at http://www.dwheeler.com/oss fs why.html (2007),31 January 2008.
54. In an online appendix we provide a formal game-theoretic analysis of these interactions-available at http://myweb.fsu.edu/dsiegel/Research.
55. We use target and vulnerability interchangeably in this paper. Strictly speaking, targets are physical entities while vulnerabilities are gaps in defense that permit a successful attack on such entities. We use the words interchangeably, as an entity not vulnerable to attack is not really a target.
56. Sean Gorman, Networks, Complexity, and Security.
57. Robert Powell, "Defending Against Terrorist Attacks with Limited Resources," American Political Science Review 101, no. 3 (August 2007): 527-41.
58. Formally, there is a range of parameter values over which releasing information is an equilibrium action.
59. The appendix is available at http://myweb.fsu.edu/dsiegel/Research.
60. Respondent 724229888.
61. In February 2009, more than seven years into efforts to enhance information flow, local, state, and federal officials we surveyed continued to complain about inadequate sharing within the law enforcement and first-responder communities. Respondents 724215968, 724215641, 724214470, and 724212480.
62. Khalid M. Medani, "Financing Terrorism or Survival? Informal Finance and State Collapse in Somalia, and the U.S. War on Terrorism," Middle East Report 32, no. 2 (Summer 2002): 2-9.
63. Releasing information can help correct misunderstandings that hinder counterterrorism efforts. For example, the frequent refrain that terrorists are irrational and motivated by religious fervor hinders government response. Law enforcement officials believing this line are less likely to focus attention on the secular middle-class individuals who make up the majority of terrorist operatives in some groups. See Alan B. Kreuger and Jitka Malečkova, "Education, Poverty and Terrorism: Is There a Causal Connection?" The Journal of Economic Perspectives 17, no. 4 (Autumn 2003): 119-44.
64. Claude Berrebi, "Evidence About the Link Between Education, Poverty and Terrorism Among Palestinians," Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy 13, no. 1 (2007), available at http://www.bepress.com/peps/vol13/iss1/2.
65. Marc Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004).
66. Christine Fair and Bryan Shepherd, "Research Note: Who Supports Terrorism? Insights from Fourteen Muslim Countries," Case Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 29, no. 2 (January/February 2006).
67. and C. Christine Fair, "Militant Recruitment in Pakistan: A New Look at the Militancy-Madrasah Connection," Asia Policy 1, no. 4 (Summer 2007).
68. In August 2003 the failure of one power line south of Cleveland, Ohio, led to the cascading failure of the regional power infrastructure, affecting fifty million people and causing four to ten billion dollars in economic losses in the United States alone. Eric J. Lerner, "What's Wrong with the Electric Grid," American Institute of Physics, accessed at http://www.aip.org/tip/INPHFA/vol-9/iss-5/p8.html, 2003, 7 April 2006.
69. and Electric Power Annual, 2003," Electric Information Agency, accessed at http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/FTPROOT/electricity/034803.pdf, 7 April 2006.
70. Lawrence M. Wein and Yifan Liu, "Analyzing a Bioterror Attack on the Food Supply: The Case of Botulinum Toxin in Milk," Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 102, no. 28 (July 2005): 9,985-89.
71. Rick Weiss, "Report Warns of Threat to Milk Supply: Release of Study Citing Vulnerability to Bioterrorism Attack Was Opposed by U.S. Officials," Washington Post, 29 June 2005, A08.
72. Lawrence M. Wein and Manas Baveja, "Using Fingerprint Image Quality to Improve the Identification Performance of the U.S. Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology Program," Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 102, no. 21 (May 2005): 7,772-75.
73. Gansler and Lucyshyn, The Unintended Audience.
74. Stanley Falkow et al., Seeking Security: Pathogens, Open Access, and Genome Databases (New York: National Academies Press, 2004).
75. For information on how genetic information with tremendous therapeutic potential also contains the necessary information for crafting racially targeted biological weapons, see Tonya Putnam, "Racial Weapons: An Essay on the Law, Ethics, and Politics of Biological Warfare in the Age of the Genome," paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association (San Diego, CA, March 2006).
76. Whether it does so depends on the nature of the vulnerability identified. Making information on the chemicals used in industrial facilities readily available can clearly help first responders. Making public information about which electrical lines to attack to cripple the power grid may seem less helpful. Such information might not help local law enforcement much because there are many points of attack for any particular line, but could help terrorists a great deal. However, what sharing such information might do is spur power companies to self-interested action to protect the grid, perhaps by building redundant capacity. Government Accountability Office, Information Sharing: Practices That Can Benefit Critical Infrastructure Protection.
77. Respondent 724229888.
78. Stephen E. Flynn and Daniel B. Prieto, Neglected Defense: Mobilizing the Private Sector to Support Homeland Security (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 2006), 15-16.
79. Congressional Budget Office (CBO), Homeland Security and the Private Sector (Washington, DC: The Congress of the United States, 2004), 2-4.
80. Rudy Darken and Ted G. Lewis, "Potholes and Detours in the Road to Critical Infrastructure Protection Policy," Homeland Security Affairs 1, no. 2 (Fall 2005).
81. In addition to the previous examples, we can think of New York City's tragic dependence on airline passenger screeners in Boston.
82. Ted G. Lewis, interview by Jacob Shapiro, 5 January 2007.
83. Leonard Anderson, "Power Grid Aims for Backup Supplies," Reuters, 2 June 2005.
84. CBO, Homeland Security and the Private Sector.
85. Public knowledge or heightened attention sometimes leads to temporary protective measures that last until private interests reassert themselves once the issue becomes less politically salient. Following a January 2004 train crash in South Carolina that released toxic gases killing nine people, Washington D.C. enacted a ban on the transportation of deadly chemicals along rail corridors passing close to the national capital area. See Philip Auerswald et al., "The Challenge of Protecting Critical Infrastructure," Issues in Science and Technology 22, no. 1 (Fall 2005), accessed at http://www.issues.org/22.1/auerswald.html, 6 April 2006.
86. After several months of legal fights, the ban was overturned in court, although the city government continues to support a ban. See Carol D. Leonnig, "Judge Upholds Hazmat Rail Ban," Washington Post, 19 April 2005, B02.
87. and Carol D. Leonnig, "Judge Demands To View Rail Plan D.C. Hazmat Cargo Ban At Issue in CSX Lawsuit," Washington Post, 22 September 2005, B01
88. On the electrical grid, see Stephen E. Flynn, America-Still Unprepared, Still in Danger, report of an Independent Task Force Sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations (2002).
89. Antonio Regalado and Gary Fields, "Blackout a Reminder of Grid's Vulnerability to Terror," Wall Street Journal, 15 August 2003, A4.
90. R. James Woolsey and Rachel Belton, "We Must Face a Connected World's "Butterfly Effect'," Los Angeles Times, 5 May 2004.
91. Amy Abel, Government Activities to Protect the Electrical Grid, (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, RS21958, 2004).
92. and Stephen E. Flynn, private communication with Jacob Shapiro, 20 October 2005.
93. See for example the detailed process for identifying critical infrastructure dependencies outlined in Washington State, Homeland Security Region 6 Critical Infrastructure Protection Plan, 2005, accessed at http://www.metrokc.gov/prepare/docs/Region6CIP, 10 April 2006.
94. For a summary, see John D. Moteff, Risk Management and Critical Infrastructure Protection.
95. Henry H. Willis et al., Estimating Terrorism Risk (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2005).
96. and Gordon Woo, private communication with Jacob Shapiro, 20 January 2006.
97. Appendix available at http://myweb.fsu.edu/dsiegel/Research.
98. Releasing such information might also allow for more effective evacuation and management plans, reducing post-attack casualties and thereby counteracting backlash.
99. The Census Bureau similarly makes confidential census data available to outside researchers through the Center for Economic Studies.
100. Dennis Fixler, Chief Statistician, Bureau of Economic Analysis, phone interview with Jacob Shapiro, 1 February 2008
101. The first draft of the White House report on Hurricane Katrina, for example, was written by a contractor.
102. Neither condition was obtained, for example, in the case of the US-VISIT program whose managers had never considered that the system could be gamed in the ways Wein and Baveja identified and so never passed information on the system to outside analysts with the necessary expertise.
103. Debates over the utility of the National Asset Database reveal that uncertainties identified in John D. Moteff and Paul Parfomak, Critical Infrastructure and Key Assets: Definition and Identification (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, RL32631, 2004) about criticality have not been remedied as of 2006
104. as per John D. Moteff, Critical Infrastructure: The National Asset Database (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, RL33648, 2006).
105. Defense Science Board, Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Critical Homeland Infrastructure Protection (Washington, DC: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, 2007).
106. This argument is no different than that frequently applied to environmental degradation. Billions of dollars in cleanup and damages by Exxon after the Valdez spill may have led to increased safety measures in shipping, but these measures were not taken before the spill despite regulation, and twenty years later damage from the spill lingers.
107. Government Accountability Office, Nuclear Power Plants Efforts Made to Upgrade Security, but the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's Design Basis Threat Process Should Be Improved.
108. Ibid., 6.
109. See Government Accountability Office, Preliminary Observations on Efforts to Improve Security at Nuclear Power Plants.
110. and Matthew L. Wald, "Group Says Test of Nuclear Plant's Security Was Too Easy," New York Times, 16 September 2003, A7. These two sources could be used to infer the number of attackers commercial nuclear plants are prepared to defend against but played a role in motivating stronger action by the NRC.
111. Defense Science Board, Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Critical Homeland Infrastructure Protection, (Washington, DC: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense For Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, 2007).
112. Executive Order no. 13356, Federal Register 69, no. 169, 1 September 2004.
113. Executive Order no. 13388, Federal Register 70, no. 207, 27 October 2005.
114. George W. Bush, National Strategy for Information Sharing, National Security Council, The White House, October 2007.
115. The friction introduced by SBU labels should hardly be surprising given that the majority of federal agencies using various SBU controls do so based on internally generated guidelines that are often ambiguous as to what kinds of information qualify for specific controls, who has authority to apply those controls, and the rules for passing that information to others within the government. National Security Archive, PSEUDO-SECRETS: A Freedom of Information Audit of the U.S. Government's Policies on Sensitive Unclassified Information (Washington, DC: The George Washington University, 2006).
116. Patricia McDermott and Emily Feldman, Secrecy Report Card 2007.
117. Patricia McDermott and Amy Fuller, Secrecy Report Card 2008 (Washington, DC: OpenTheGovernment.Org, 2008).
118. The great dissatisfaction with the Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN) provides another cautionary note on the difficulty of selective information sharing as per Lara Jakes Jordan, "Homeland Security Information Network Criticized," Washington Post, 10 May 2005, A06.
119. Respondent 724216542.
120. Respondent 724339460.
121. For example, Aum Shinrikyo chemist Masami Tsuchiya reportedly figured out how to synthesize VX nerve gas only after discovering the formula for a VX precursor in a chemistry magazine as discussed in Brian Jackson et al., Aptitude for Destruction: Volume 2, Case Studies of Organizational Learning in Five Terrorist Groups (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2005).
122. The general failure of terrorist cells to identify truly innovative modes of attack-a few highsalience examples aside-supports this assumption.
123. We formally derive the optimal stopping points and outcomes for T and G under both rules in Propositions 1 and 2 in the appendix available at http://myweb.fsu.edu/dsiegel/Research.
124. Larry Grathwohl in Larry Grathwohl and Frank Reagan, Bringing Down America (New Rochelle, NY: Arlington House, 1976), 143-44 describes a remarkably amateurish bomb design proposed by senior Weatherman William Ayers.
125. Shane O'Doherty, The Volunteer: A Former IRA Man's True Story (Scarborough, ON: HarperCollins Publishers Canada, 1993) for example, provides a vivid description of the development of the Provisional Irish Republican Army's (PIRA) gelignite bombs.
126. The game Robert Powell analyzes in "Defending Against Terrorist Attacks with Limited Resources," illustrates the dynamics of resource allocation, but does not consider the role of information.
127. Robert Powell, "Allocating Defensive Resources with Private Information about Vulnerability," American Political Science Review 101 (2007): 799-810 considers an aspect of information we do not, the fact that resource allocation itself can signal the level of vulnerability of a known site, but does not consider the more explicit forms of information that we do. In his model, informative signaling (in the form of a separating equilibrium) may sometimes be achieved if the more vulnerable sites are easier to defend on the margins.
128. Though developed independently, our models also speak to some of the issues analyzed in Jun Zhuang and Vicki M. Bier, "Balancing Terrorism and Natural Disasters-Defensive Strategy with Endogenous Attacker Effort," Operations Research 55, no. 5 (September-October 2007): 976-91. Their main focus is on resource allocation decisions when terrorists choose a level of effort, rather than making a binary decision about whether or not to attack.
129. We can think of these as the sites that G found during the earlier search process.
130. That is, for those sites that it found during its search process.
131. This does not, of course, preclude T from repeatedly attacking a well-known vulnerability, such as airliners, if it views this as a particularly high-value target or if G is unable to defend this vulnerability sufficiently well despite its being common knowledge as per Jeremy Shapiro, Managing Homeland Security: Develop a Threat Based Strategy (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2008). The important comparison for T is the expected utility derived from an attack on each target, which depends on both the target's value and its probability of being attacked successfully.
132. Emergency Planning & Community Right-to-Know Act, P.L. 99-499, 42 USC 11001-11050.
133. Moteff and Stevens, Critical Infrastructure Information Disclosure.
134. Indeed, both Sean Gorman, Networks, Complexity, and Security
135. and Wein and Baveja, "Using Fingerprint Image Quality" do just that.
136. See, for example, J. I. Katz, "Detection of Neutron Sources in Cargo Containers" Science and Global Security 14, nos. 2 and 3 (December 2006): 145-49, which suggests an alternative screening technique that remedies challenges previously identified by physicists working for the U.S. government.
137. Appendix available at http://myweb.fsu.edu/dsiegel/Research.
138. Robert Powell, "Allocating Defensive Resources with Private Information about Vulnerability," examines the case where it does.
139. Falkow et al., Seeking Security.
140. We thank the editors for suggesting this possibility and pushing us to address it.
141. For example, the IR Scholar Survey detailed in Richard Jordan et al., "One Discipline or Many? TRIP Survey of International Relations Faculty in Ten Countries," 2009, College of William and Mary, Williamsburg, VA, available at http://irtheoryandpractice.wm.edu/projects/trip/Final Trip Report 2009.pdf, received a 42 percent response rate from potential U.S. respondents.
142. Respondent 723214546.
143. Respondent 724627525.
144. Respondent 724716301.
145. Recognizing the increased complexity of information policy, the 110th Congress created a subcommittee explicitly charged with examining how America guards and shares information. See Alexander Bolton, "Waxman to stir debate with transparency subcommittee," The Hill, 4 January 2007.
146. As discussed in the section "Strategic Information Release," this does not imply that terrorists will never rationally target well-defended targets, such as airliners, if they are also of particularly high value. Walter Enders and Todd Sandler, "What Do We Know about the Substitution Effect in Transnational Terrorism." In Andrew Silke and G. Ilardi ed., Researching Terrorism: Trends, Achievements, Failures (Ilford, UK: Frank Cass, 2004).
147. Our findings thus match and deepen the intuition embedded in CBO, Homeland Security and the Private Sector and Flynn and Prieto, Neglected Defense that encouraging openness increases the chances that private companies will undertake the appropriate level of counterterrorism protection.
148. Respondent 724452379.