The Nash bargaining solution in general n-person cooperative games

Journal of Economic Theory

Volumn 145, Issue 6, 2010, Pages 2356-2379

  Okada, Akira ^a  

^a HITOTSUBASHI UNIVERSITY   (Japan)

Author keywords

Coalition; Core; Externality; N Person cooperative games; Nash bargaining solution; Noncooperative bargaining

Indexed keywords

EID: 78649720072     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: 10957235     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2010.07.001     Document Type: Article

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