Implementation of the recursive core for partition function form games

Journal of Mathematical Economics

Volumn 42, Issue 6, 2006, Pages 771-793

  Huang, Chen Ying ^a   Sjöström, Tomas ^b  

^a NATIONAL TAIWAN UNIVERSITY   (Taiwan)

^b RUTGERS UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Consistency; Cooperative game theory; Non cooperative implementation; Partition function form games; Recursive core

Indexed keywords

EID: 33748436659     PISSN: 03044068     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2005.08.009     Document Type: Article

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