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Volumn 43, Issue 2, 2003, Pages 196-213

Consistent solutions for cooperative games with externalities

Author keywords

Externalities; Recursive core

Indexed keywords


EID: 0038054051     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0899-8256(03)00011-3     Document Type: Article
Times cited : (27)

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* 이 정보는 Elsevier사의 SCOPUS DB에서 KISTI가 분석하여 추출한 것입니다.