Should the CEO also be chair of the board? An empirical examination of family-controlled public firms

Family Business Review

Volumn 20, Issue 2, 2007, Pages 111-126

  Braun, Michael ^a   Sharma, Anurag ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MONTANA   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 34447123463     PISSN: 08944865     EISSN: 17416248     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1741-6248.2007.00090.x     Document Type: Article

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