Behavior, human capital and the formation of gangs

Kyklos

Volumn 63, Issue 4, 2010, Pages 517-529

  Dnes, Antony W ^a   Garoupa, Nuno ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF HULL   (United Kingdom)

^b UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT URBANA CHAMPAIGN   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

HUMAN CAPITAL; MODEL; POLICY IMPLEMENTATION;

EID: 77958510706     PISSN: 00235962     EISSN: 14676435     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-6435.2010.00485.x     Document Type: Article

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