Optimal punishment when individuals may learn deviant values

International Review of Law and Economics

Volumn 21, Issue 3, 2001, Pages 271-285

  Baik, Kyung Hwan ^a   Kim, In Gyu ^b  

^a Sungkyunkwan University   (South Korea)

^b Hallym University   (South Korea)

Author keywords

Loosely organized crime; Optimal fine policy; Repeat offenders; Social learning of illicit gains

Indexed keywords

EID: 0042907601     PISSN: 01448188     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0144-8188(01)00062-X     Document Type: Article

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