Optimal law enforcement and criminal organization

Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization

Volumn 63, Issue 3, 2007, Pages 461-474

  Garoupa, Nuno ^a,b,c  

^a UNIVERSIDADE NOVA DE LISBOA   (Portugal)

^b Foundation for Applied Economic Research FEDEA   (Spain)

^c CEPR   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Agents; Organized crime; Principal; Sanctions

Indexed keywords

EID: 34047141564     PISSN: 01672681     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2004.04.010     Document Type: Article

References (30)

1. Abadinsky H. The McDonald's-ization of the Mafia. In: Bynum T. (Ed). Organized Crime in America: Concepts and Controversies (1987), Criminal Justice Press, New York 125-148
2. Alexander B. The rational racketeer: pasta protection in Depression era Chicago. Journal of Law and Economics 40 (1997) 175-202
3. Backhaus J. Defending organized crime? A note. Journal of Legal Studies 8 (1979) 623-631
4. Becker G. Crime and punishment: an economic analysis. Journal of Political Economy 76 (1968) 169-217
5. Buchanan J.M. A defense of organized crime?. In: Rottenberg S. (Ed). The Economics of Crime and Punishment (1973), American Enterprise Institute, Washington, DC 119-132
6. Dick A.R. When does organized crime pay? A transaction cost analysis. International Review of Law and Economics 15 (1995) 25-45
7. Dorn N., Oette L., and White S. Drugs importation and the bifurcation of risk: capitalization, cut outs, and organised crime. British Journal of Criminology 38 (1998) 537-560
8. Gambetta D. Inscrutable markets. Rationality and Society 6 (1994) 334-352
9. Garoupa N. The theory of optimal law enforcement. Journal of Economic Surveys 11 (1997) 267-295
10. Garoupa N. The economics of organized crime and optimal law enforcement. Economic Inquiry 38 (2000) 278-288
11. Grossman H.I. Rival kleptocrats: the Mafia versus the State. In: Fiorentini G., and Peltzman S. (Eds). The Economics of Organised Crime (1995), Cambridge University Press and CEPR, Cambridge 143-156
12. Jennings W.P. A note on the economics of organized crime. Eastern Economic Journal 3 (1984) 315-321
13. Kelly R.J. The nature of organized crime and its operations. In: Edelhertz H. (Ed). Major Issues in Organized Crime Control (1987), National Institute of Justice, Washington, DC
14. Klein B., and Murphy K. Vertical integration as a self-enforcing contractual arrangement. American Economic Review 87 (1997) 415-420
15. Konrad K.A., and Skaperdas S. Credible threats in extortion. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 33 (1997) 23-39
16. Konrad K.A., and Skaperdas S. Extortion. Economica 65 (1998) 461-477
17. Levitt S.D., and Venkatesh S.A. An economic analysis of a drug-selling gang's finances. Quarterly Journal of Economics 115 (2000) 755-789
18. Malik A.S. Avoidance, screening and optimum enforcement. Rand Journal of Economics 21 (1990) 341-353
19. Milhaupt C.J., and West M.D. The dark side of private ordering: an institutional and empirical analysis of organized crime. University of Chicago Law Review 67 (2000) 41-98
20. Polinsky A.M., and Shavell S. The economic theory of public enforcement of law. Journal of Economic Literature 38 (2000) 45-76
21. Polo M. Internal cohesion and competition among criminal organisations. In: Fiorentini G., and Peltzman S. (Eds). The Economics of Organised Crime (1995), Cambridge University Press and CEPR, Cambridge 87-109
22. Posner R. Economic Analysis of Law. 5th ed. (1998), Aspen Law & Business, New York
23. Reuter P. Disorganized Crime (1983), MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts
24. Robinson J. The Laundrymen: Inside the World's Third Largest Business (1994), Pocket Books, London
25. Shavell S. The optimal level of corporate liability given the limited ability of corporations to penalize their employees. International Review of Law and Economics 17 (1997) 203-213
26. Skaperdas S. Contest success functions. Economic Theory 7 (1996) 283-290
27. Skaperdas S. The political economy of organized crime: providing protection when the state does not. Economics of Governance 2 (2001) 173-202
28. Skaperdas S., and Syropoulos C. Gangs as primitive states. In: Fiorentini G., and Peltzman S. (Eds). The Economics of Organised Crime (1995), Cambridge University Press and CEPR, Cambridge 61-82
29. Spagnolo G. Optimal Leniency Programs (2000), Stockholm School of Economics Mimeograph
30. Turvani M. Illegal markets and the new institutional economics. In: Ménard C. (Ed). Transaction Cost Economics (1997), Edward Elgar, Cheltenham 1-29