Organized crime or individual crime? Endogenous size of a criminal organization and the optimal law enforcement

Economic Inquiry

Volumn 43, Issue 3, 2005, Pages 661-675

  Chang, Juin Jen ^a   Lu, Huei Chung ^a   Chen, Mingshen ^b  

^a FU JEN CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY   (Taiwan)

^b NATIONAL TAIWAN UNIVERSITY   (Taiwan)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 25844464809     PISSN: 00952583     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/ei/cbi046     Document Type: Article

References (31)

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