Credible threats in extortion

Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization

Volumn 33, Issue 1, 1997, Pages 23-39

  Konrad, Kai A ^a   Skaperdas, Stergios ^b  

^a FREIE UNIVERSITÄT BERLIN   (Germany)

^b UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

Credible threats; Extortion; Strategic investment

Indexed keywords

EID: 0031138794     PISSN: 01672681     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/s0167-2681(97)00019-x     Document Type: Article

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