Changes in CEO compensation structure and the impact on firm performance following CEO turnover

Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting

Volumn 29, Issue 3, 2007, Pages 315-338

  Blackwell, David W ^a   Dudney, Donna M ^b   Farrell, Kathleen A ^b  

^a TEXAS A AND M UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF NEBRASKA LINCOLN   (United States)

Author keywords

CEO turnover; Compensation structure; Executive compensation; Firm performance

Indexed keywords

EID: 35148830387     PISSN: 0924865X     EISSN: 15737179     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11156-007-0034-y     Document Type: Article

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