Entry into winner-take-all and proportional-prize contests: An experimental study

Journal of Public Economics

Volumn 94, Issue 9-10, 2010, Pages 604-611

  Cason, Timothy N ^a   Masters, William A ^b   Sheremeta, Roman M ^c  

^a PURDUE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b PURDUE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^c CHAPMAN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Contest; Experiments; Feedback; Gender; Performance pay; Piece rate; Risk aversion; Tournament; Tournament design

Indexed keywords

EID: 77955277837     PISSN: 00472727     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2010.05.006     Document Type: Article

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