Absolute and relative rewards for individuals in team production

Managerial and Decision Economics

Volumn 19, Issue 4-5, 1998, Pages 299-310

  Dickinson, David L ^a   Isaac, R Mark ^a  

^a Center for Language and Brain   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 38849179598     PISSN: 01436570     EISSN: 10991468     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1002/(SICI)1099-1468(199806/08)19:4/5<299::AID-MDE892>3.0.CO;2-T     Document Type: Article

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