Experimental perspectives on incentives in organisations

Central European Journal of Operations Research

Volumn 14, Issue 1, 2006, Pages 1-24

  Irlenbusch, Bernd ^a  

^a LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 33750911789     PISSN: 1435246X     EISSN: 16139178     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s10100-006-0157-6     Document Type: Article

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