Finite local consistency characterizes generalized scoring rules

IJCAI International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence

Volumn , Issue , 2009, Pages 336-341

  Xia, Lirong ^a   Conitzer, Vincent ^a  

^a Duke University   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

AXIOMATIC CHARACTERIZATION; COMPUTATIONAL SOCIAL CHOICES; LOCAL CONSISTENCY; MANIPULABILITY; NATURAL PROPERTIES; SCORING RULES; VOTING RULES;

ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE;

EID: 78751688692     PISSN: 10450823     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: None     Document Type: Conference Paper

References (20)

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