Norm enforcement: The role of third parties

Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics

Volumn 166, Issue 2, 2010, Pages 239-258

  Carpenter, Jeffrey P ^a   Matthews, Peter Hans ^a  

^a MIDDLEBURY COLLEGE   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 77954073559     PISSN: 09324569     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1628/093245610791343003     Document Type: Article

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