No switchbacks: Rethinking aspiration-based dynamics in the ultimatum game

Theory and Decision

Volumn 58, Issue 4, 2005, Pages 351-385

  Carpenter, Jeffrey ^a   Matthews, Peter Hans ^b  

^a MIDDLEBURY COLLEGE   (United States)

^b NONE

Author keywords

Aspirations; Experiment; Learing; Replicator dynamics; Ultimatum game

Indexed keywords

EMBEDDED SYSTEMS; GAME THEORY; PROCESS CONTROL;

EVOLUTIONARY DYNAMICS; ULTIMATUM GAME;

DECISION THEORY;

EID: 27844542127     PISSN: 00405833     EISSN: 15737187     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11238-005-0284-x     Document Type: Article

References (17)

1. Bendor, J., Mookherjee, D. and Ray, D. (2001), Aspiration-based reinforcement learning in repeated games, International Game Theory Review, 47(2), 159-174.
2. Binmore, K., Gale, J. and Samuleson, L. (1995), Learning to be imperfect: the ultimatum game, Games and Economic Behavior 8, 56-90.
3. Bolton, G. and Zwick, R. (1995), Anonymity versus punishment in ultimatum bargaining, Games and Economic Behavior 10, 95-121.
4. Carpenter, J. (2003), Bargaining outcomes as the result of coordinated expectations: an experimental study of sequential bargaining. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 47(2), 119-139.
5. Chen, H.C., Freidman, J. and Thisse, J.F. (1995), Boundedly rational nash equilibrium: a probabilistic choice approach, Games and Economic Behavior 18, 32-54.
6. Costa-Gomes, M. and Weizsacker, G. (2001), Another look at decision rules in games: an experimental study, mimeo.
7. Friedman, D. (1996), Equilibrium in evolutionary games: some experimental results, The Economic Journal 106(January), 1-125.
8. Glendenning, P. (1994), Stability, instability and chaos: an introduction to the theory of nonlinear differential equations, Cambridge University Press: New York.
9. Güth, W., Schmittberger, R. and Schwarze, B. (1982), An experimental analysis of ultimatum bargaining, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 3, 367-388.
10. Karandikar, R., Mookherjee, D., Ray, D. and Vega-Redondo, F. (1998), Evolving aspirations and cooperation. Journal of Economic Theory 80, 292-331.
11. Luce, R.D. (1959), Individual choice behavior: a theoretical analysis. Wiley: New York.
12. McKelvey, R. and Palfrey, T. (1995), Quantal response equilibria for normal from games, Games and Economic Behavior 10, 6-38.
13. Prasnikar, V. and Roth, A. (1992), Considerations of fairness and strategy: experimental data from sequential games, Quarterly Journal of Economics 107(3), 865-888.
14. Siegel, S. and Fouraker, L. (1960), Bargaining and group decision making: experiments in bilateral monopoly, McGraw-Hill: New York.
15. Stahl, D.O. (2001), Action reinforcement learning versus rule learning, mimeo.
16. van Huyck, J., Battalio, R., Mathur, S. and van Huyck, P. (1995), On the origin of convention: evidence from symmetric bargaining games, International Journal of Game Theory 24, 187-212.
17. van Huyck, J., Cook, J. and Battalio, R. (1994), Selection dynamics, asymptotic stability, and adaptive behavior, Journal of Political Economy 102, 975-1005.