Maturity policies of CEO severance contracts and forced internal turnover

Managerial Finance

Volumn 35, Issue 9, 2009, Pages 772-783

  van Dalsem, Shane ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN LA CROSSE   (United States)

Author keywords

Chief executives; Compensation; Employee turnover; Severance

Indexed keywords

EID: 85015613402     PISSN: 03074358     EISSN: 17587743     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1108/03074350910973694     Document Type: Article

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