Regulatory inertia

RAND Journal of Economics

Volumn 34, Issue 3, 2003, Pages 413-437

  Faure Grimaud, Antoine ^a   Martimort, David ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0242595791     PISSN: 07416261     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/1593739     Document Type: Review

References (29)

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