Internationalization and changes in tax policy in OECD countries: The importance of domestic veto players

Comparative Political Studies

Volumn 31, Issue 3, 1998, Pages 321-352

  Hallerberg, Mark ^b   Basinger, Scott ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

^b NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0032362352     PISSN: 00104140     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/0010414098031003003     Document Type: Article

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