Credible commitments and the international criminal court

International Organization

Volumn 64, Issue 2, 2010, Pages 225-256

  Simmons, Beth A ^a   Danner, Allison ^b  

^a HARVARD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b Assistant United States Attorney   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 77952401261     PISSN: 00208183     EISSN: 15315088     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S0020818310000044     Document Type: Article

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