Strategic learning in games with symmetric information

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 42, Issue 1, 2003, Pages 25-47

  Gossner, Olivier ^a,b   Vieille, Nicolas ^c  

^a UNIVERSITÉ PARIS OUEST NANTERRE LA DÉFENSE   (France)

^b UNIVERSITÉ CATHOLIQUE DE LOUVAIN   (Belgium)

^c HEC PARIS   (France)

Author keywords

Bandit problems; Games with incomplete information; Public value of information

Indexed keywords

EID: 0038405035     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0899-8256(02)00535-3     Document Type: Review

References (17)

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