Some asymptotic results in discounted repeated games of one-sided incomplete information

Mathematics of Operations Research

Volumn 28, Issue 3, 2003, Pages 433-462

  Cripps, Martin W ^a   Thomas, Jonathan P ^b  

^a WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY IN ST LOUIS   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF EDINBURGH   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Folk theorem; Incomplete information; Repeated games; Reputation

Indexed keywords

ASYMPTOTIC STABILITY; PERTURBATION TECHNIQUES; SET THEORY; THEOREM PROVING;

DISCOUNTED REPEATED GAMES; FOLK THEOREM; NASH EQUILIBRIA;

GAME THEORY;

EID: 0141517277     PISSN: 0364765X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1287/moor.28.3.433.16394     Document Type: Article

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