SCOPUS 정보 검색 플랫폼

Volumn 73, Issue 2, 2005, Pages 629-645

A partial folk theorem for games with unknown payoff distributions

a NONE

Author keywords

Folk theorem; Learning; Payoff uncertainty; Repeated games

Indexed keywords

EID: 27744535165 PISSN: 00129682 EISSN: None Source Type: Journal
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0262.2005.00589.x Document Type: Review

Times cited : (29)

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