Aid effectiveness and the politics of personalism

Comparative Political Studies

Volumn 43, Issue 6, 2010, Pages 735-762

  Wright, Joseph ^a  

^a PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Democracy; Foreign aid; Growth; Personalism

Indexed keywords

EID: 77951640968     PISSN: 00104140     EISSN: 15523829     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/0010414009358674     Document Type: Article

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