The causes of welfare state expansion: Deindustrialization or globalization?

World Politics

Volumn 52, Issue 3, 2000, Pages 313-349

  Iversen, Torben ^a   Cusack, Thomas R ^b  

^a HARVARD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b Wissen schaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung ^*  (Germany)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

DEINDUSTRIALIZATION; GLOBALIZATION; PUBLIC SPENDING; SOCIAL POLICY; WELFARE PROVISION;

EID: 0033925445     PISSN: 00438871     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S0043887100016567     Document Type: Article

References (116)

1. See David Cameron, "The Expansion of the Public Economy: A Comparative Analysis," American Political Science Review 72, no. 4 (1978); and Peter Katzenstein, Small States in World Markets (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1985).
2. See David Cameron, "The Expansion of the Public Economy: A Comparative Analysis," American Political Science Review 72, no. 4 (1978); and Peter Katzenstein, Small States in World Markets (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1985).
3. Dani Rodrik, "Why Do More Open Economies Have Larger Governments?" Journal of Political Economy 106 (October 1998).
4. See Geoffrey Garrett, "Capital Mobility, Trade and the Domestic Politics of Economic Policy," International Organization 49, no. 4 (1995); and idem, Partisan Politics in the Global Economy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).
5. See Geoffrey Garrett, "Capital Mobility, Trade and the Domestic Politics of Economic Policy," International Organization 49, no. 4 (1995); and idem, Partisan Politics in the Global Economy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).
6. There has been, however, significant cross-country variation in exposure to these risks. Those countries that were relatively early "deruralizers" were confronted with less problematic conditions, which helped them cope with structural change. Among these conditions were small entering-age cohorts, relatively low female participation in labor markets, and relatively buoyant labor markets. All of these conditions eased the problems of structural change. For a discussion of the timing of "deruralization" and its consequences, see Gøsta Esping-Andersen, Social Foundations of Postindustrial Economies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 24-27.
7. Hans-Peter Blossfeld, "Is the German Dual System a Model for a Modern Vocational Training System?" International Journal of Comparative Sociology 33, nos. 3-4 (1993).
8. Martin Kohli, Martin Rein, Anne-Marie Guillemard, and Herman van Gunsteren, eds., Time for Retirement: Comparative Studies of Early Exit from the Labor Force (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992).
9. Gøsta Esping-Andersen, The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990).
10. See also Torben Iversen and Anne Wren, "Equality, Employment, and Budgetary Restraint: The Trilemma of the Service Economy," World Politics 50 (July 1998).
11. Garrett (fn. 3, 1998), 7.
12. Cameron (fn. 1); John G. Ruggie, "International Regimes, Transactions and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order," in Stephen D. Krasner, ed., International Regimes (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Univerity Press, 1983); Katzenstein (fn. 1)
13. Cameron (fn. 1); John G. Ruggie, "International Regimes, Transactions and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order," in Stephen D. Krasner, ed., International Regimes (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Univerity Press, 1983); Katzenstein (fn. 1)
14. Cameron (fn. 1); John G. Ruggie, "International Regimes, Transactions and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order," in Stephen D. Krasner, ed., International Regimes (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Univerity Press, 1983); Katzenstein (fn. 1)
15. See Fritz Scharpf, Crisis and Choice in European Social Democracy (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1991); and Paulette Kurzer, Business and Banking (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1993).
16. See Fritz Scharpf, Crisis and Choice in European Social Democracy (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1991); and Paulette Kurzer, Business and Banking (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1993).
17. See Dani Rodik, Has Globalization Gone Too Far? (Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics, 1997), chap. 3.
18. Rodrik (fn. 2).
19. The government sector is less volatile, but it does not make sense to include it in the comparison since this sector is supposed to be growing as a consequence of high volatility in the exposed sectors.
20. This constraint could come on both the spending and the revenue side. Thus, there is broad consensus that capital market integration has raised the price of running deficits, while others (including Rod-rik) have argued that it has made taxation of capital more difficult. The latter argument, however, is disputed by Duane Swank, who finds no evidence that business taxation has become less important for revenue generation. See Swank, "Funding the Welfare State: Globalization and the Taxation of Business in Advanced Market Economies," Comparative Political Studies 46 (September 1998).
21. Katzenstein (fn. 1).
22. Garrett (fn. 3, 1998), 80; Nouriel Roubini and Jeffrey D. Sachs, "Political and Economic Determinants of Budget Deficits in the Industrial Democracies," European Economic Review 33, no. 5 (1998).
23. Garrett (fn. 3, 1998), 80; Nouriel Roubini and Jeffrey D. Sachs, "Political and Economic Determinants of Budget Deficits in the Industrial Democracies," European Economic Review 33, no. 5 (1998).
24. See Thomas Cusack, "Partisan Politics and Public Finance: Changes in Public Spending in the Industrialized Democracies, 1955-1989," Public Choice 91 (June 1997); and idem, "Partisan Politics and Fiscal Policy," Comparative Political Studies 32 (January 1999).
25. See Thomas Cusack, "Partisan Politics and Public Finance: Changes in Public Spending in the Industrialized Democracies, 1955-1989," Public Choice 91 (June 1997); and idem, "Partisan Politics and Fiscal Policy," Comparative Political Studies 32 (January 1999).
26. Ibid.
27. Cusack (fn. 24, 1997).
28. For recent examples see Cusack (fn. 24); Alexander Hicks and Duane Swank, "Politics, Institutions, and Welfare Spending in Industrialized Democracies, 1960-82," American Political Science Review 86 (September 1992); and Evelyn Huber, Charles Ragin, and John Stephens, "Social Democracy, Christian Democracy, Constitutional Structure and the Welfare State," American Journal of Sociology 99, no 3 (1993).
29. For recent examples see Cusack (fn. 24); Alexander Hicks and Duane Swank, "Politics, Institutions, and Welfare Spending in Industrialized Democracies, 1960-82," American Political Science Review 86 (September 1992); and Evelyn Huber, Charles Ragin, and John Stephens, "Social Democracy, Christian Democracy, Constitutional Structure and the Welfare State," American Journal of Sociology 99, no 3 (1993).
30. For recent examples see Cusack (fn. 24); Alexander Hicks and Duane Swank, "Politics, Institutions, and Welfare Spending in Industrialized Democracies, 1960-82," American Political Science Review 86 (September 1992); and Evelyn Huber, Charles Ragin, and John Stephens, "Social Democracy, Christian Democracy, Constitutional Structure and the Welfare State," American Journal of Sociology 99, no 3 (1993).
31. Gøsta Esping-Andersen, Markets against Politics: The Social Democratic Road to Power (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985); idem (fn. 7).
32. Gøsta Esping-Andersen, Markets against Politics: The Social Democratic Road to Power (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985); idem (fn. 7).
33. Walter Korpi, The Working Class in Welfare Capitalism: Work, Unions and Politics in Sweden (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1978); idem, The Democratic Class Struggle (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1983).
34. Walter Korpi, The Working Class in Welfare Capitalism: Work, Unions and Politics in Sweden (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1978); idem, The Democratic Class Struggle (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1983).
35. John D. Stephens, The Transition from Capitalism to Socialism (London: Macmillan, 1979).
36. See the pathbreaking study by Isabela Mares on the role of employees in social policy formation. Mares, "Negotiated Risks: Employers' Role in Social Policy Development" (Ph.D. diss., Harvard University, 1998).
37. See, for example, ibid; Cathie Jo Martin, "Nature or Nurture? Sources of Firm Preference for National Health Reform," American Political Science Review 89 (December 1995); and Peter Swenson, "Arranged Alliance: Business Interests in the New Deal," Politics and Society 25, no. 1 (1997).
38. See, for example, ibid; Cathie Jo Martin, "Nature or Nurture? Sources of Firm Preference for National Health Reform," American Political Science Review 89 (December 1995); and Peter Swenson, "Arranged Alliance: Business Interests in the New Deal," Politics and Society 25, no. 1 (1997).
39. See, for example, ibid; Cathie Jo Martin, "Nature or Nurture? Sources of Firm Preference for National Health Reform," American Political Science Review 89 (December 1995); and Peter Swenson, "Arranged Alliance: Business Interests in the New Deal," Politics and Society 25, no. 1 (1997).
40. Harold L. Wilensky, The Welfare State and Equality (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975).
41. Peter Flora and Jens Alber, "Modernization, Democratization, and the Development of Welfare States in Europe," in Flora and Arnold Heidenheimer, eds., The Development of Welfare States in Europe and America (London: Transaction Books, 1981).
42. Ibid., 41.
43. See Wilensky (fn. 33), 47.
44. There are passages in Harold L. Wilensky and Charles N. Lebaux's Industrial Society and Social Welfare that concern the problem of relocating and retraining workers made redundant in the process of industrialization in the U.S. This logic is clearly in line with our argument. We thank an anonymous reader for pointing this out. Wilensky and Lebaux. Industrial Society and Social Welfare: The Impact of Industrialization on the Supply and Organization of Social Welfare Services in the United States (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1958).
45. There are passages in Harold L. Wilensky and Charles N. Lebaux's Industrial Society and Social Welfare that concern the problem of relocating and retraining workers made redundant in the process of industrialization in the U.S. This logic is clearly in line with our argument. We thank an anonymous reader for pointing this out. Wilensky and Lebaux. Industrial Society and Social Welfare: The Impact of Industrialization on the Supply and Organization of Social Welfare Services in the United States (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1958).
46. Garrett (fn. 3).
47. The attraction of the median voter depends on the electoral system. In two-party systems the mechanism is vote maximization, which leads to centrist appeals. See Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy (New York: Harper and Row, 1957), chaps. 7-8; and Gary W. Cox, "Centripetal and Centrifugal Incentives in Electoral Systems," American Journal of Political Science 34, no. 4 (1990). In multiparty systems the mechanism is office maximization through which governing coalitions come to recognize the importance of appealing to the median voter. See Michael Laver and Norman Schofield, Multiparty Government: The Politics of Coalition in Europe (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991).
48. The attraction of the median voter depends on the electoral system. In two-party systems the mechanism is vote maximization, which leads to centrist appeals. See Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy (New York: Harper and Row, 1957), chaps. 7-8; and Gary W. Cox, "Centripetal and Centrifugal Incentives in Electoral Systems," American Journal of Political Science 34, no. 4 (1990). In multiparty systems the mechanism is office maximization through which governing coalitions come to recognize the importance of appealing to the median voter. See Michael Laver and Norman Schofield, Multiparty Government: The Politics of Coalition in Europe (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991).
49. The attraction of the median voter depends on the electoral system. In two-party systems the mechanism is vote maximization, which leads to centrist appeals. See Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy (New York: Harper and Row, 1957), chaps. 7-8; and Gary W. Cox, "Centripetal and Centrifugal Incentives in Electoral Systems," American Journal of Political Science 34, no. 4 (1990). In multiparty systems the mechanism is office maximization through which governing coalitions come to recognize the importance of appealing to the median voter. See Michael Laver and Norman Schofield, Multiparty Government: The Politics of Coalition in Europe (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991).
50. Alan Meltzer, and Scott Richard, "A Rational Theory of the Size of the Government," Journal of Political Economy 8, no. 9 (1981). See also Hicks and Swank (in. 27).
51. Alan Meltzer, and Scott Richard, "A Rational Theory of the Size of the Government," Journal of Political Economy 8, no. 9 (1981). See also Hicks and Swank (in. 27).
52. Arend Lijphart, "Unequal Participation: Democracy's Unresolved Dilemma - Presidential Address," American Political Science Review 91, no. 1 (1997).
53. Esping-Andersen (fn. 7).
54. See Gøsta Esping-Andersen, Changing Classes: Stratification and Mobility in Postindustrial Societies (London: Sage, 1993); idem, Social Foundations of Postindustrial Societies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999); Iversen and Wren (fn. 8); and Andrew Glyn, "Low Pay and the Volume of Work" (Manuscript, Corpus Christi College, Oxford University, 1997).
55. See Gøsta Esping-Andersen, Changing Classes: Stratification and Mobility in Postindustrial Societies (London: Sage, 1993); idem, Social Foundations of Postindustrial Societies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999); Iversen and Wren (fn. 8); and Andrew Glyn, "Low Pay and the Volume of Work" (Manuscript, Corpus Christi College, Oxford University, 1997).
56. See Gøsta Esping-Andersen, Changing Classes: Stratification and Mobility in Postindustrial Societies (London: Sage, 1993); idem, Social Foundations of Postindustrial Societies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999); Iversen and Wren (fn. 8); and Andrew Glyn, "Low Pay and the Volume of Work" (Manuscript, Corpus Christi College, Oxford University, 1997).
57. See Gøsta Esping-Andersen, Changing Classes: Stratification and Mobility in Postindustrial Societies (London: Sage, 1993); idem, Social Foundations of Postindustrial Societies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999); Iversen and Wren (fn. 8); and Andrew Glyn, "Low Pay and the Volume of Work" (Manuscript, Corpus Christi College, Oxford University, 1997).
58. See Nathaniel Beck and Jonathan N. Katz, "Nuisance vs. Substance: Specifying and Estimating Time-Series-Cross-Section Models," in John R. Freeman, ed., Political Annlysis, vol. 6 (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan 1996), 11.
59. The reason is that in the model using levels of spending on the left-hand side, much of the variance will be accounted for by the lagged dependent variable, showing simply that current spending depends on past spending.
60. See Nathaniel Beck, "Comparing Dynamic Specifications: The Case of Presidential Approval," in James Stimson, ed., Political Analysis, vol. 2 (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1992).
61. An F-test indicates that the country dummies belong in the model.
62. Nathaniel Beck and Jonathan N. Katz, "What to Do (and Not to Do) with Time-Series-Cross-Section Data," American Political Science Review 89, no. 3 (1995).
63. Specifically, we used Roy E. Welch's "bounded-influence technique," which weights individual cases if they exceed a size-adjusted cut-off point. Welch, "Regression Sensitivity Analysis and Bounded-Influence Estimation," in Jan Kmenta and James B. Ramsey, eds., Evaluation of Econometric Models (New York: Academic Press, 1980), 164-66. See also J. Fox, Regression Diagnostics (London: Sage Publications 1991), 31.
64. Specifically, we used Roy E. Welch's "bounded-influence technique," which weights individual cases if they exceed a size-adjusted cut-off point. Welch, "Regression Sensitivity Analysis and Bounded-Influence Estimation," in Jan Kmenta and James B. Ramsey, eds., Evaluation of Econometric Models (New York: Academic Press, 1980), 164-66. See also J. Fox, Regression Diagnostics (London: Sage Publications 1991), 31.
65. Andrian Wood, North-South Trade, Employment and Inequality: Changing Fortunes in a Skill-Driven World (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994); Edward E. Learner, Sources of International Comparative Advantage: Theory and Evidence (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1984); idem, "Trade Economists View of U.S. Wages and 'Globalization'" (Paper presented at the Political Economy of European Integration Study Group Meeting, University of California, Berkeley, January 1996).
66. Andrian Wood, North-South Trade, Employment and Inequality: Changing Fortunes in a Skill- Driven World (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994); Edward E. Learner, Sources of International Comparative Advantage: Theory and Evidence (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1984); idem, "Trade Economists View of U.S. Wages and 'Globalization'" (Paper presented at the Political Economy of European Integration Study Group Meeting, University of California, Berkeley, January 1996).
67. Andrian Wood, North-South Trade, Employment and Inequality: Changing Fortunes in a Skill- Driven World (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994); Edward E. Learner, Sources of International Comparative Advantage: Theory and Evidence (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1984); idem, "Trade Economists View of U.S. Wages and 'Globalization'" (Paper presented at the Political Economy of European Integration Study Group Meeting, University of California, Berkeley, January 1996).
68. Rodrik (fn. 2), chap. A.
69. We tested whether the effects of employment losses in agriculture differ from those in manufacturing by breaking the deindustrialization variable into two component variables: one variable defined as 100 minus manufacturing employment as a percent of the working-age population, and another defined as 100 minus agricultural employment as a percent of the working-age population. The results tor both variables are similar to those for the deindustrialization variable, but when both variables are entered simultaneously, the manufacturing variable has a somewhat stronger effect (0.045 versus 0.035 for transfers, and 0.035 versus 0.022 for consumption). One reviewer suggested that a possible reason for this pattern can be found in social mobility studies, which show that a greater decline in agriculture occurs through intergenerational mobility than in manufacturing.
70. Paul Pierson, Dismantling the Welfare State: Reagan, Thatcher and the Politics of Retrenchment (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994); idem, "The New Politics of the Welfare State," World Politics 48 (January 1996).
71. Paul Pierson, Dismantling the Welfare State: Reagan, Thatcher and the Politics of Retrenchment (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994); idem, "The New Politics of the Welfare State," World Politics 48 (January 1996).
72. See Eileen Appelbaum and Ronald Schettkat, "Employment and Productivity in Industrialized Countries," International Labor Reviews 134, nos. 4-5 (1995); and Iversen and Wren (fn. 8).
73. See Eileen Appelbaum and Ronald Schettkat, "Employment and Productivity in Industrialized Countries," International Labor Reviews 134, nos. 4-5 (1995); and Iversen and Wren (fn. 8).
74. Robert Rowthorn, "Corporatism and Labour Market Performance," in Jukka Pekkarinen, Matti Pohjola, and Rowthorn, eds., Social Corporatism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992); Michael Wallerstein, "Wage-Setting Institutions and Pay Inequality in Advanced Industrial Societies," American Journal of Political Science 43 (July 1999); David Rueda and Jonas Pontusson, "Wage Inequality and Varieties of Capitalism" (Working paper, Institute for European Studies, Cornell University, 1998).
75. Robert Rowthorn, "Corporatism and Labour Market Performance," in Jukka Pekkarinen, Matti Pohjola, and Rowthorn, eds., Social Corporatism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992); Michael Wallerstein, "Wage-Setting Institutions and Pay Inequality in Advanced Industrial Societies," American Journal of Political Science 43 (July 1999); David Rueda and Jonas Pontusson, "Wage Inequality and Varieties of Capitalism" (Working paper, Institute for European Studies, Cornell University, 1998).
76. Robert Rowthorn, "Corporatism and Labour Market Performance," in Jukka Pekkarinen, Matti Pohjola, and Rowthorn, eds., Social Corporatism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992); Michael Wallerstein, "Wage-Setting Institutions and Pay Inequality in Advanced Industrial Societies," American Journal of Political Science 43 (July 1999); David Rueda and Jonas Pontusson, "Wage Inequality and Varieties of Capitalism" (Working paper, Institute for European Studies, Cornell University, 1998).
77. See, for example, Wood (fn. 52); Steven S. Saeger, "Globalization and Economic Structure in the OECD" (Ph.D. diss., Harvard University, 1996); and idem, "Globalization and Deindustrialization: Myth and Reality in the OECD," Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv 133, no. 4 (1997).
78. See, for example, Wood (fn. 52); Steven S. Saeger, "Globalization and Economic Structure in the OECD" (Ph.D. diss., Harvard University, 1996); and idem, "Globalization and Deindustrialization: Myth and Reality in the OECD," Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv 133, no. 4 (1997).
79. See, for example, Wood (fn. 52); Steven S. Saeger, "Globalization and Economic Structure in the OECD" (Ph.D. diss., Harvard University, 1996); and idem, "Globalization and Deindustrialization: Myth and Reality in the OECD," Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv 133, no. 4 (1997).
80. Saeger (fn. 62, 1997), 604.
81. Wolfgang Streeck, "German Capitalism: Does It Exist? Can It Survive?" in Colin Crouch and Streeck, eds., Political Economy and Modern Capitalism: Mapping Convergence and Diversity (London: Sage, 1997).
82. Robert Rowthorn and Ramana Ramaswamy, "Deindustrialization: Causes and Implications" (International Monetary Fund Working Paper, no. 42, Washington, D.C., 1997); idem, "Growth, Trade, and Deindustrialization, International Monetary Fund Staff Papers 46 (March 1999);
83. Robert Rowthorn and Ramana Ramaswamy, "Deindustrialization: Causes and Implications" (International Monetary Fund Working Paper, no. 42, Washington, D.C., 1997); idem, "Growth, Trade, and Deindustrialization, International Monetary Fund Staff Papers 46 (March 1999);
84. Paul Krugman, Pop Internationalism (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1996).
85. Rowthorn and Ramaswamy (fn. 65, 1999), 19.
86. We recognize that the debate over trade with LDC countries is broader than the question of whether it has led to widespread deindustrialization. It also involves issues such as the relative performance of particular manufacturing industries, relative prices, and above all, wage inequality. For a good introduction to the debate see the special issue of Journal of Economic Perspectives 9 (Special issue, 1995). For our purposes, however, the key issue is whether or not our main independent variable, deindustrialization, is in large measure the result of competition from low-wage countries.
87. Robert Bacon and Walter Eltis, Britain's Economic Problem: Too Few Producers (London: Macmillan, 1976).
88. See, for example, Meltzer and Richard (fn. 40); and Alberto Alesina and Roberto Perotti, "The Welfare State and Competitiveness," American Economic Review 87 (December 1997).
89. See, for example, Meltzer and Richard (fn. 40); and Alberto Alesina and Roberto Perotti, "The Welfare State and Competitiveness," American Economic Review 87 (December 1997).
90. See Appelbaum and Schettkat (fn. 59); and idem, "The End of Full Employment? On Economic Development in Industrialized Countries," Intereconomics 29 (May-June 1994).
91. See Appelbaum and Schettkat (fn. 59); and idem, "The End of Full Employment? On Economic Development in Industrialized Countries," Intereconomics 29 (May-June 1994).
92. Investment is measured as a percentage share of GDP. It is taken from the Robert Summers and Alan Heston, Penn World Tables, version 5.5, datafile (Cambridge: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1993).
93. Jonas Pontusson, "Explaining the Decline of European Social Democracy: The Role of Structural Economic Change," World Politics 47 (July 1995).
94. OECD, Labour Force Statistics (Paris: OECD, various years); and transfer data.
95. Summers and Heston (fn. 74).
96. Denis P. Quinn, and Carla Inclan, "The Origin of Financial Openness: A Study of Current and Capital Account Internationalization," American Journal of Political Science 41, no. 3 (1997).
97. OECD (fn. 78).
98. Thomas T. Mackie and Richard Rose, The International Almanac of Electoral History, 3d ed. (London: Macmillan, 1991).
99. International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, Voter Turnout from 1945 to 1997: A Global Report on Political Participation (Stockholm: IDEA Information Services, 1997).
100. OECD (fn. 78); and transfer data.
101. Thomas Cusack, "The Changing Contours of Government" (Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung, WZB Discussion Paper, no. 304, 1991); OECD (fn. 78); Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, The SIPRI Year Book (Stockholm: SIPRI, various years).
102. Thomas Cusack, "The Changing Contours of Government" (Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung, WZB Discussion Paper, no. 304, 1991); OECD (fn. 78); Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, The SIPRI Year Book (Stockholm: SIPRI, various years).
103. Thomas Cusack, "The Changing Contours of Government" (Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung, WZB Discussion Paper, no. 304, 1991); OECD (fn. 78); Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, The SIPRI Year Book (Stockholm: SIPRI, various years).
104. Cusack (fn. 85); and OECD, National Accounts, Part II: Detailed Tables (Paris: OECD, various years).
105. Cusack (fn. 85); and OECD, National Accounts, Part II: Detailed Tables (Paris: OECD, various years).
106. Summers and Heston (fn. 74).
107. Cusack (fn. 24, 1997).
108. Francis Castles and Peter Mair, "Left-Right Political Scales: Some 'Expert' Judgments," European Journal of Political Research 12, no. 1 (1984).
109. OECD, National Accounts CD-Rom (Paris: OECD, 1995).
110. Density data: Jelle Visser, European Trade Union in Figures (Deventer, Netherlands: Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, 1989); and idem, "Unionization Trends Revisited" (Manuscript, University of Amsterdam, 1996). Centralization data: Torben Iversen, "Wage Bargaining, Central Bank Independence and the Real Effects of Money," International Organization 52 (Summer 1998).
111. Density data: Jelle Visser, European Trade Union in Figures (Deventer, Netherlands: Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, 1989); and idem, "Unionization Trends Revisited" (Manuscript, University of Amsterdam, 1996). Centralization data: Torben Iversen, "Wage Bargaining, Central Bank Independence and the Real Effects of Money," International Organization 52 (Summer 1998).
112. Density data: Jelle Visser, European Trade Union in Figures (Deventer, Netherlands: Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, 1989); and idem, "Unionization Trends Revisited" (Manuscript, University of Amsterdam, 1996). Centralization data: Torben Iversen, "Wage Bargaining, Central Bank Independence and the Real Effects of Money," International Organization 52 (Summer 1998).
113. IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook (Washington, D.C.: IMF, various years).
114. OECD (fn. 86).
115. Roubini and Sachs (fn. 23) ; and OECD (fn. 86).
116. Roubini and Sachs (fn. 23) ; and OECD (fn. 86).