Veto players and the rule of law in emerging democracies

Comparative Political Studies

Volumn 37, Issue 1, 2004, Pages 55-87

  Andrews, Josephine T ^a   Montinola, Gabriella R ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

Madison; Rule of law; Veto players

Indexed keywords

EID: 0347933016     PISSN: 00104140     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/0010414003260125     Document Type: Review

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