Security design and the allocation of voting rights: Evidence from the Australian IPO market

Journal of Corporate Finance

Volumn 4, Issue 2, 1998, Pages 107-131

  Taylor, Stephen ^a   Whittred, Greg ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF SYDNEY   (Australia)

^b UNIVERSITY OF NEW SOUTH WALES   (Australia)

Author keywords

Corporate governance; Differential voting rights; G32; G34; Initial public offerings

Indexed keywords

EID: 0038465566     PISSN: 09291199     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/s0929-1199(97)00012-6     Document Type: Article

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