What's in a vote? The short- and long-run impact of dual-class equity on IPO firm values

Journal of Accounting and Economics

Volumn 45, Issue 1, 2008, Pages 94-115

  Smart, Scott B ^a   Thirumalai, Ramabhadran S ^b   Zutter, Chad J ^c  

^a INDIANA UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b INDIAN SCHOOL OF BUSINESS   (India)

^c UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH   (United States)

Author keywords

CEO turnover; Dual class; Firm value; Governance; Initial public offerings; Ownership structure

Indexed keywords

EID: 38949181558     PISSN: 01654101     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2007.07.002     Document Type: Article

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