Tullock and Hirshleifer: A meeting of the minds

Review of Economic Design

Volumn 11, Issue 2, 2007, Pages 101-124

  Alcalde, José ^a   Dahm, Matthias ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ALICANTE   (Spain)

^b UNIVERSITAT ROVIRA I VIRGILI   (Spain)

Author keywords

(Non )deterministic contest; All pay auction; Campaign contributions; Cap; Contest success function; Exclusion principle; Preemption effect; Rent dissipation; Rent seeking

Indexed keywords

EID: 34748877186     PISSN: 14344742     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s10058-007-0031-6     Document Type: Article

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