Difference-form contest success functions and effort levels in contests

European Journal of Political Economy

Volumn 14, Issue 4, 1998, Pages 685-701

  Baik, Kyung Hwan ^a  

^a Sungkyunkwan University   (South Korea)

Author keywords

C72; Contests; D72; D74; Difference form contest success functions; Effort levels

Indexed keywords

EID: 0000386588     PISSN: 01762680     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0176-2680(98)00032-9     Document Type: Article

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