On the robustness of non-linear personalized price combinatorial auctions

European Journal of Operational Research

Volumn 206, Issue 1, 2010, Pages 248-259

  Schneider, S ^a   Shabalin, P ^a   Bichler, M ^a  

^a TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY OF MUNICH   (Germany)

Author keywords

Allocative efficiency; Combinatorial auction; Computational experiment; Primal dual auction; Simulation; Subgradient auction

Indexed keywords

ALLOCATIVE EFFICIENCY; COMBINATORIAL AUCTION; COMPUTATIONAL EXPERIMENT; PRIMAL-DUAL; SUBGRADIENT;

COMMERCE; COSTS; EXPERIMENTS; MACHINE DESIGN;

COMPUTATIONAL EFFICIENCY;

EID: 77950021583     PISSN: 03772217     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.ejor.2010.01.038     Document Type: Article

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