Auctions with bidder-determined allowable combinations

European Journal of Operational Research

Volumn 161, Issue 2, 2005, Pages 399-415

  Park, Sunju ^a   Rothkopf, Michael H ^a  

^a RUTGERS UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Auctions bidding; Combinatorial auctions

Indexed keywords

COMBINATORIAL MATHEMATICS; COMPETITION; DECISION MAKING; RISK ASSESSMENT; SET THEORY;

ASSETS; AUCTION/BIDDING; COMBINATORIAL AUCTIONS; GAME-THEORETIC AUCTION;

OPERATIONS RESEARCH;

EID: 5444253194     PISSN: 03772217     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.ejor.2003.08.057     Document Type: Article

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