Multi-object auctions with package bidding: An experimental comparison of Vickrey and iBEA

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 68, Issue 2, 2010, Pages 557-579

  Chen, Yan ^a   Takeuchi, Kan ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN   (United States)

^b HITOTSUBASHI UNIVERSITY   (Japan)

Author keywords

Combinatorial auctions; Experimental economics; iBEA auction

Indexed keywords

EID: 75349091690     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: 10902473     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2009.10.007     Document Type: Article

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