Designing network protocols for good equilibria

SIAM Journal on Computing

Volumn 39, Issue 5, 2010, Pages 1799-1832

  Chen, Ho Lin ^a   Roughgarden, Tim ^b   Valiant, Gregory ^c  

^a CALIFORNIA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (United States)

^b Stanford University   (United States)

^c UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

Cost sharing; Game theory; Nash equilibrium; Network design; Price of anarchy

Indexed keywords

COST SHARING; COST-SHARING GAMES; DIRECTED GRAPHS; END USERS; EQUILIBRIUM BEHAVIOR; MULTICOMMODITY NETWORKS; NASH EQUILIBRIA; NASH EQUILIBRIUM; NETWORK COSTS; NETWORK DESIGN; NETWORK GAME; OPTIMAL COSTS; PRICE OF ANARCHY; SELFISH USERS; TECHNICAL TOOLS; UNDIRECTED GRAPH;

COST EFFECTIVENESS; COSTS; GAME THEORY; GRAPH THEORY; OPTIMIZATION; TELECOMMUNICATION NETWORKS;

NETWORK PROTOCOLS;

EID: 77049085773     PISSN: 00975397     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1137/08072721X     Document Type: Article

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