Online multicast with egalitarian cost sharing

Annual ACM Symposium on Parallelism in Algorithms and Architectures

Volumn , Issue , 2008, Pages 70-76

  Charikar, Moses ^a   Karloff, Howard ^b   Mathieu, Claire ^c   Naor, Joseph ^d   Saks, Michael ^e  

^a Princeton University   (United States)

^b AT AND T LABS RESEARCH   (United States)

^c Brown Univerity   (United States)

^d TECHNION ISRAEL INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (Israel)

^e RUTGERS UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Best response; Nash equilibrium; Price of anarchy; Shapley value

Indexed keywords

BEST RESPONSE; BEST RESPONSES; COST SHARING MECHANISMS; EXISTING TERMINALS; MULTICAST; MULTICAST GAMES; NASH EQUILIBRIUM; NASH EQUILIBRIUMS; PRICE OF ANARCHIES; PRICE OF ANARCHY; SHAPLEY VALUE; STEINER TREES; UNDIRECTED GRAPHS;

AD HOC NETWORKS; COST EFFECTIVENESS; GAME THEORY; MULTICASTING; PORT TERMINALS; TELECOMMUNICATION NETWORKS;

COSTS;

EID: 57349163108     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1145/1378533.1378544     Document Type: Conference Paper

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