A survey of network formation models: Stability and efficiency

Group Formation in Economics: Networks, Clubs, and Coalitions

Volumn , Issue , 2005, Pages 11-57

  Jackson, Matthew O ^a  

^a CALIFORNIA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84929713805     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1017/CBO9780511614385.002     Document Type: Chapter

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