Investment and liquidation in renegotiation-proof contracts with moral hazard

Journal of Monetary Economics

Volumn 51, Issue 4, 2004, Pages 713-751

  Quadrini, Vincenzo ^a,b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA   (United States)

^b NEW YORK UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Financial contract; Firm investment; Liquidation; Renegotiation proof

Indexed keywords

EID: 2142652090     PISSN: 03043932     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jmoneco.2003.08.014     Document Type: Article

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