Efficiency in repeated games revisited: The role of private strategies

Econometrica

Volumn 74, Issue 2, 2006, Pages 499-519

  Kandori, Michihiro ^a   Obara, Ichiro ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF TOKYO   (Japan)

^b UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

Efficiency; Imperfect public monitoring; Mixed strategy; Partnership game; Private equilibrium; Private strategy; Repeated game; Two state machine

Indexed keywords

EID: 33645029185     PISSN: 00129682     EISSN: 14680262     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0262.2006.00669.x     Document Type: Article

References (19)

1. ABREU, D., P. MILGROM, AND D. PEARCE (1991): "Information and Timing in Repeated Partnerships," Econometrica, 59, 1713-1733.
2. ABREU, D., D. PEARCE, AND E. STACCHETTI (1990): "Toward a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring," Econometrica, 58, 1041-1063.
3. BEN-PORATH, E., AND M. KAHNEMAN (2003): "Communication in Repeated Games with Costly Monitoring," Games and Economic Behavior, 44, 227-250.
4. ELY, J. C., J. HÖRNER, AND W. OLSZEWSKI (2005): "Belief-Free Equilibria in Repeated Games," Econometrica, 73, 377-415.
5. ELY, J. C., AND J. VÄLIMÄKI (2002): "A Robust Folk Theorem for the Prisoner's Dilemma," Journal of Economic Theory, 102, 84-105.
6. FUDENBERG, D., D. K. LEVINE, AND E. MASKIN (1994): "The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information," Econometrica, 62, 997-1040.
7. FUDENBERG, D., AND J. TIROLE (1991): Game Theory. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
8. KANDORI, M. (1999): "Check Your Partners' Behavior by Randomization: New Efficiency Results on Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring," Technical Report CIRJE-F-49, University of Tokyo.
9. _ (2002): "Introduction to Repeated Games with Private Monitoring," Journal of Economic Theory, 102, 1-15.
10. _ (2003): "Randomization, Communication, and Efficiency in Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring," Econometrica, 71, 345-353.
11. KANDORI, M., AND I. OBARA (2003): "Efficiency in Repeated Games Revisited: The Role of Private Strategies," UCLA Working Paper 826.
12. _ (2006): "Supplement to 'Efficiency in Repeated Games Revisited: The Role of Privace Strategies'," Econometrica Supplementary Material, 74, http://www.econometricsociety.org/ecta/supmat/5074Ex2.pdf.
13. LEHRER, E. (1991): "Internal Correlation in Repeated Games," International Journal of Game Theory, 19, 431-456.
14. MAILATH, G. J., S. A. MATTHEWS, AND T. SEKIGUCHI (2002): "Private Strategies in Finitely Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring," Contributions to Theoretical Economics, 2, http://www.bepress.com/bejte/ contributions/vol2/iss1/art2.
15. OBARA, I. (1999): "Private Strategy and Efficiency: Repeated Partnership Game Revisited," Unpublished Manuscript, University of Pennsylvania.
16. _ (2001): "Private Information in Repeated Games," Ph.D. Thesis, University of Pennsylvania.
17. _ (2003): "The Full Surplus Extraction Theorem with Hidden Actions," Unpublished Manuscript, UCLA.
18. PICCIONE, M. (2002): "The Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma with Imperfect Private Monitoring," Journal of Economic Theory, 102, 70-83.
19. RADNER, R., R. MYERSON, AND E. MASKIN (1986): "An Example of a Repeated Partnership Game with Discounting and with Uniformly Inefficient Equilibria," Review of Economic Studies, 53, 59-69.